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Denmark has not had cases of bovine tuberculosis (bovTB) for more than 30 years 
but is obliged by trade agreements to undertake traditional meat inspection (TMI) of 
finisher pigs from non-controlled housing to detect bovTB. TMI is associated with higher 
probability of detecting bovTB but is also more costly than visual-only inspection (VOI). 
To identify whether VOI should replace TMI of finisher pigs from non-controlled housing, 
the cost of error – defined here as probability of overlooking infection and associated 
economic costs - should be assessed and compared with surveillance costs. First, a 
scenario tree model was set up to assess the ability of detecting bovTB in an infected 
herd (HSe) calculated for three within-herd prevalences, WHP (1, 5 and 10%), for four 
different surveillance scenarios (TMI and VOI with or without serological test, respectively). 
HSe was calculated for six consecutive 4-week surveillance periods until predicted 
bovTB detection (considered high-risk periods HRP). 1-HSe was probability of missing 
all positives by each HRP. Next, probability of spread of infection, Pspread, and number 
of infected animals moved were calculated for each HRP. Costs caused by overlooking 
bovTB were calculated taking into account Pspread, 1-HSe, eradication costs, and trade 
impact. Finally, the average annual costs were calculated by adding surveillance costs 
and assuming one incursion of bovTB in either 1, 10 or 30 years. Input parameters 
were based on slaughterhouse statistics, literature and expert opinion. Herd sensitivity 
increased by high-risk period and within-herd prevalence. Assuming WHP=5%, HSe 
reached median 90% by 2nd HRP for TMI, whereas for VOI this would happen after 6th 
HRP. Serology had limited impact on HSe. The higher the probability of infection, the 
higher the probability of detection and spread. TMI resulted in lowest average annual 
costs, if one incursion of bovTB was expected every year. However, when assuming 
one introduction in 10 or 30 years, VOI resulted in lowest average costs. It may be more 
cost-effective to focus on imported high-risk animals coming into contact with Danish 
livestock, instead of using TMI as surveillance on all pigs from non-controlled housing.
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intrOductiOn
Denmark has been officially free from bovine tuberculosis (OTF) 
since the first declaration in 1980. The last detected, positive cases of 
bovine tuberculosis (bovTB) were seen in farmed deer in 1994 (1) 
and traced back to imported deer. The year of the last case of bovTB 
in Danish pigs is unknown, but it has not been detected for decades 
(Personal communication, S. Mellergård, Danish Veterinary and 
Food Administration, 2017); before that occasional cases occurred 
(2). BovTB may be found in pigs, in particular if raised outdoors 
in areas known for presence of bovTB (3). In the United Kingdom, 
which is not OTF, pigs are found positive for bovTB sporadically; 
from 2000 to 2010, between 0 and 29 pigs were found positive 
for bovTB annually (4). This low number is probably a result of 
a spill-over from infected cattle or wildlife. The main infection 
pathway for Mycobacterium bovis to pigs is by ingestion of infected 
tissue or contaminated dairy products (5–7), primarily leading to 
the alimentary form of the disease implying lesions in the lymph 
nodes in the gastro-intestinal tract including the mandibular lymph 
nodes. Contrary to cattle, pigs are not believed to excrete M. bovis in 
milk or urine although it cannot be fully ruled out (5, 6, 8). Hence, 
pigs usually serve as dead-end-hosts for M. bovis.
Meat inspection is an essential element of eradication and 
proving freedom from bovTB (9). In the European Union (EU), 
traditional meat inspection (TMI) involving palpation and 
incisions into the mandibular lymph nodes as well as palpation of 
selected gastro-intestinal lymph nodes have been used to detect 
bovTB in pigs and cattle during post mortem meat inspection for 
decades. EU Regulation 854/2004/EC introduced the option of 
visual-only inspection (VOI) of meat for controlled housing pigs, 
if a risk assessment could prove no or only a negligible increase 
in risk for human or animal health associated with a change in 
inspection (10).
Controlled housing refers to indoor production facilities 
with a high level of biosecurity. EU legislation stipulates a range 
of requirements for a holding to be considered a controlled 
housing compartment (11). Holdings not complying with 
these requirements are considered as non-controlled (i.e., low 
biosecurity). In  Denmark,  auditing of the biosecurity status is 
undertaken by a third party independent auditor at 3 year intervals 
(12).
In Denmark, two national risk assessments were carried out 
focusing among others on the effect of omitting palpation and 
incisions into the mandibular lymph nodes and the palpation of 
the jejuni lymph nodes (13, 14). Based upon these two assessments, 
a partial VOI of pigs from controlled housing was implemented 
implying no routine opening of the heart, no routine incisions 
into the mandibular lymph nodes, and no routine palpations of 
the intestinal lymph nodes. In 2013, a third Danish risk assessment 
evaluated the risk associated with not palpating the lungs (15). 
In 2016, a full VOI was implemented for indoor-raised finishers 
after acceptance of equivalence was obtained from important trade 
partners.
Following a report by the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) recommending to use VOI of swine to limit the spread 
of foodborne hazards such as Salmonella spp. (16), the EU meat 
inspection legislation was changed in 2014. Regulation 218/2014/
EC stipulates that post mortem meat inspection in all swine should 
be carried out as VOI as the general approach. Hereby, VOI was 
supposed to replace TMI of all pigs, independent of age or rearing 
system, unless geographical information, food chain information 
or findings during ante mortem inspection revealed a risk to human 
or animal health (17). However, the EU Regulation did not foresee 
that legislation in countries outside the EU may not allow VOI, 
which is known to have a lower sensitivity of detection of bovTB 
compared to TMI (16, 18). This has led to negotiations between 
the EU and the authorities in the USA, during which it has been 
mentioned that “if an EU Member State requests visual-only post-
mortem inspection in hogs other than market hogs that have been 
raised indoors, they must provide supporting documentation and 
data that supports visual-only inspection in these situations” (19). 
In fact, bilateral trade agreements based on the requirements set by 
the EU Regulation from 2004 do not consider VOI for pigs reared 
under non-controlled housing conditions, because VOI was not 
allowed in that animal group in the EU before 2014. Therefore, any 
change to meat inspection of pigs from non-controlled housing 
must be renegotiated with such trade partners.
The median annual probability of introduction of bovTB to 
Danish cattle stemming from cattle import and immigrant workers 
was previously estimated at 0.7%; and import of cattle constituted 
the far majority of the relatively low probability of introduction 
(20). Introduction by wildlife was not included in the estimation, as 
bovTB has never been detected in Danish wildlife (1). The annual 
number of imports of pigs to Denmark is limited; between 2014 
and 2016 imports targeted two to five herds and involved 366 pigs 
on average (1). Because bovTB should not spread between pigs, 
the introduction to Danish pigs is unlikely to occur via imported 
pigs. Introduction of bovTB into non-controlled pig productions 
through other species than pigs cannot be excluded; and potential 
transmission pathways include introduction of infected wildlife or 
other kinds of imported animals.
Denmark consists mainly of islands and there is only one 
terrestrial border with Germany, which is 68 km long. Germany 
is considered OTF, however, bovTB cases were found from 2005 
to 2008 in cattle and wildlife. Germany is considered free from 
bovTB in wildlife since November 2009 and in domestic livestock 
since April 2015 (21). Only few free-range wild boars remain in 
Denmark; they are mainly found in forest areas northeast of the 
German border due to migration over the border (22, 23). Due 
to a concern for the spreading of African swine fever, the Danish 
authorities have launched an eradication campaign for wild boar 
not kept under fence in Denmark (http:// mfvm. dk/ nyheder/ 
nyhed/ nyhed/ minister- gaar- til- kamp- for- at- hindre- afrikansk- 
svinepest/). In conclusion, the probability of introduction of bovTB 
due to immigrating wildlife seems to be very low.
Guard alpacas or llamas are widely used for livestock protection 
in countries like Australia, because of these animals’ protective 
behaviour including protection against canids (24). However, these 
animals may carry bovTB. Between one and 15 camelid premises 
were identified annually as new incidents of culture-confirmed M. 
bovis in Great Britain in the years from 2004 to 2015 (4). In Belgium, 
bovTB was recently introduced with imported llamas (Personal 
communication, S. Welby, Coda-Cerva, 2017). Consequently, the 
present work takes into account this potential pathway and uses 
Hansen et al.
3 June  2018 | Volume 5 | Article 92Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www. frontiersin. org
Meat Inspection of Outdoor Pigs
a hypothetical situation, where bovTB is introduced by imported, 
infected camelids from anywhere in the world.
So far, Denmark has retained TMI for pigs from non-
controlled housing due to export requirements. To determine 
whether VOI could replace TMI of pigs from non-controlled 
housing, it is necessary to compare the costs of surveillance 
with the expected cost of error, defined as the probability of 
overlooking infection, which will then lead to an outbreak, 
multiplied with the economic consequences associated with an 
outbreak (25).
The aim of this work was to compare the costs of bovTB 
surveillance (in the form of meat inspection) with the expected 
cost of error - associated with each of four ways of undertaking 
meat inspection in finisher pigs, raised in non-controlled housing 
systems in Denmark.
Materials and MethOds
general Overview and scenarios studied
Four surveillance scenarios for finishing pigs from non-controlled 
holdings were investigated in this study:
A. Traditional inspection (TMI), which is the current procedure for 
this group of pigs in Denmark, i.e., the baseline scenario,
B. Visual-only inspection (VOI),
C. Traditional inspection (TMI) in combination with serological 
testing of individual pigs,
D. Visual-only inspection (VOI) in combination with serological 
testing of individual pigs.
Scenarios C and D were inspired by the surveillance for Toxoplasma 
gondii and M. avium used by one large abattoir company in the 
Netherlands (26). The serological test assumed in this scenario 
aims to detect antibodies for M. bovis.
Each surveillance scenario was investigated by using a stochastic 
simulation model (scenario tree) which reflected the series of steps 
required to achieve detection of at least one infected pig from an 
infected herd (27). The four scenarios are described in brief in 
Table 1 and depicted in detail in Figure 1.
The calculations of probabilities of overlooking any possible 
bovTB infected pig [P(T-|D+)] from the first infected herd using 
different meat inspection regimes were based on inputs fed into 
the models originating from slaughterhouse statistics, scientific 
or grey literature, and complementing expert opinion (Table 2). 
Next, the probability of spread of infection to other herd(s) was 
estimated (Pspread). The latter probability was multiplied by the 
estimated costs of consequences in case of spreading (impact of 
error). Inputs for calculating these probabilities were based on 
expert opinion gathered by three questionnaires addressed to: (i) 
Danish pig farmers, (ii) experts of the national pig industry/market, 
and (iii) European experts on bovTB. The questionnaires can be 
obtained by contacting the corresponding author.
The Palisade software @RISK for Excel version 7.5 was used 
for the calculations. Simulations were run using 10,000 iterations 
and Latin hypercube sampling. The convergence of the model was 
taBle 1 |  Number of tests to take and cost of meat inspection for each of the four scenarios studied of Danish finisher pigs raised under non-controlled housing 
conditions.
Price* per test (€) no. of tests to take annual costs
(million €)
scenario Visual-only 
inspection
traditional Meat 
inspection
serology Visual-only 
inspection
traditional Meat 
inspection
serology
A 1.73 - 0 900,000 0 1.560
B 1.2 - - 900,000 0 0 1.080
C - 1.73 13.33 0 900,000 4,500 1.721
D 1.2 - 13.33 900,000 0 4,500 1.140
*Based upon information from the two largest abattoir companies in Denmark (Personal communication, L. Bjertrup, Danish Crown, 2016; personal communication, H. B. Lauritsen 
Tican, 2017).
Figure 1 |  Scenario tree to determine the surveillance unit sensitivity (SeU in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2) where (a) is applicable for scenario A with traditional meat 
inspection (TMI) and scenario B with visual-only inspection (VOI), and (B) is applicable for Scenario C and Scenario D where the two surveillance methods are 
supplemented by serological tests. SE = sensitivity, P = probability, Prop = proportion.
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checked every 100 iterations, on any combination of mean, SD, and 
percentile; for the main outputs. The convergence tolerance was 
specified at 3%, and the confidence level at 95%.
A list of abbreviations of variables used in the modeling is given 
in Table 2.
data collection
Data on the Investigated Pig Population
In Denmark, most pigs are raised under controlled housing 
conditions: approximately 17.7 million finisher pigs are slaughtered 
every year (28). Of those, approximately 900,000 originate from 
non-controlled housing units (Personal communication, P. Fraas, 
Friland Food, 2016).
According to different national statistics and data from the 
independent third party auditor, controlling biosecurity on-farm, 
344 holdings were identified as non-controlled finisher herds 
(28). The average production of a non-controlled housing facility 
would therefore be 2,616 finisher pigs per year corresponding to 
a 4 week delivery of around 200 finisher pigs. For this study, a 
full production cycle of finishers (from birth to slaughtering) was 
assumed to consist of six deliveries, corresponding to 5.5 months.
Literature Data
Literature data regarding the epidemiology of bovTB were 
obtained using Cab Abstract and Google Scholar abstract search. 
Moreover, the PRISMA checklist was used (http:// prisma- 
statement. org).  The literature search was restricted to English 
language. No limit on year was used; the newest references 
were used in general, unless an older one was judged as more 
relevant. The following search terms were used in the Cab 
Abstract database: “Bovine Tuberculosis”, “Mycobacterium bovis”, 
“M. bovis”, “pig*”, “swine”, “disease prevalence”, “freedom from 
disease”, “surveillance”, “meat inspection”, “introduction”, and all 
search combinations thereof, with and without the combination 
“AND pig* OR swine”. To achieve the most relevant literature, the 
search was restricted to literature containing the search terms in 
either the title or abstract, applying the “.ti,ab”-function. Search 
results were excluded or included in an initial screening based 
on (1) the title and (2) a skim-read of belonging abstract. The 
literature database Google Scholar was applied differently; we 
used Google Scholar for searching titles or authors of literature 
cited in relevant literature, achieved by the Cab Abstract search. 
Additional information about legislation was accessed through 
taBle 2 |  Input parameters for calculation of cost of error related to different meat inspection regimes in case of hypothetical outbreak of bovine tuberculosis in 
Danish pigs, 2017.
input parameter abbreviation input value /
 distribution
source
Within-herd prevalence WHPlow 0.01 (18, 21, 28)
WHPmedium 0.05 (3)
WHPhigh 0.10 (29)
Prop. of positive pigs with lesions PropL Beta (14,13) (9)
Prop. of pigs with lesions located outside digestive tract PropOUTSIDE Beta (23, 34) (3)
Prop. of positive pigs with lesions that are detected PropDTMI
PropDVOI
Pert (0.47; 0.71; 0.82)
Pert (0.142; 0.237; 0.34)
(18, 28, 30)
Se of culture test SeCULTURE Pert (0.92; 0.95; 0.98) (18, 28, 30, 31)
Prop. of pigs selected for serological sampling PropSERO 0.005 Assumed one out of 200
Se of serological test SeSERO Pert (0.66; 0.72; 0.82) (32)
Annual prob. of pig being moved between two Danish herds Pmovement 0.28 53,732 pigs moved out of 188,212 produced 
on 12 non-controlled herds in 2015
No. of herds receiving infected pigs Nreceived 1 = 74%, 2 = 13%, 3 = 4%, 
4 = 9%
Original data from (33)
No. of incursions of bovTB into Danish pigs in 30 years Nincurse 1, 3, 30 Chosen by the authors
Prob. of primary consequences, when disease has spread PprimaryS 1 Estimate: Interview of farmers
Prob. of activated eradication program, when disease has 
spread
PeradicationS 1 Estimate: Interview of international experts
Prob. of reaction from trade partners, when disease has 
spread
PtradeS 0.15 Estimate: Interview of national experts
Prob. of primary consequences, when disease has not spread PprimaryNS 1 Estimate: Interview of farmers
Prob. of activated eradication program, when disease has not 
spread
PeradicationNS 0.3 Estimate: Interview of international experts
Prob. of reaction from trade partners, when disease has not 
spread
PtradeNS 0.05 Estimate: Interview of national experts
Cost of primary consequences Cprimary €1.230 Calculated: See equation 5
Cost of activated eradication program per infected herd Ceradication €32.812 Estimate/Calculated: See equation 6
Cost of reaction from trade partners Ctrade Pert(€32.5M; €65M; €130M) Calculated: See equation 7. Assumed Japan 
shuts down for import of pigs and products 
thereof for 3/6/12 months and the products 
meanwhile sold at alternative markets with 
25% price reduction (34). Based on export 
value of € 520M in 2016 (35)
Prob. = probability. Prop. = proportion.
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the internet using public databases covering Danish legislation, 
EU legislation, and OIE guidelines.
Elicitation of Expert Opinion
Three different elicitations of expert opinion were conducted, as 
explained below. Table 2 summarizes the information elicitated.
Elicitation of Expert Opinion From Farmers
Information was collected from Danish pig producers with a 
history of bovTB suspicion in the herd. During winter 2016/17, 
a total of 40 pig holdings were imposed official supervision for 
bovTB suspicion, due to TB-like lesions (defined as granulomas 
in lymph nodes present outside the gastro-intestinal tract) 
detected at post mortem meat inspection. The normal incidence 
of this finding is between zero and two holdings per month, 
and an investigation was undertaken to reveal the reason for 
the observed increase in suspicions. Allocation of raw peat 
with tubercles of the avian-related type of tuberculosis called 
M. avium was identified as the cause of the outbreak (29). The 
owners of the 40 pig holdings under suspicion for bovTB were 
contacted by employees from their abattoirs to introduce them 
to the project and to obtain their approval to participate. Contact 
details of the farmers were supplied by the abattoirs. Opinions 
of 39 farmers were elucidated by telephone interview using a 
structured questionnaire, which required between 5 and 20 
min each. The questionnaire included questions about possible 
ways of introduction for M. bovis, M. avium or the human-
related type of tuberculosis M. tuberculosis to their farms. The 
farmers were also asked if they had experienced any economic 
losses in relation to restrictions, rejected animals or tuberculin 
test. The questionnaire can be obtained through contact to the 
corresponding author of the paper.
Elicitation of Expert Opinion From National Experts
The second expert opinion elicitation aimed at collecting data 
on the economic consequences of an introduction of bovTB to 
the national pig herd. This questionnaire was addressed to 14 
national experts with knowledge of trade in live animals and animal 
products from the Danish Agriculture & Food Council (n = 9), 
the Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark (n = 3), and 
animal trade companies (n = 2). The 14 experts were interviewed 
in groups or individually, either face to face or by phone using 
a pre-developed questionnaire. Each interview lasted from 30 
to 60 min, and all interviews were carried out by the same two 
interviewers. The questionnaire can be obtained through contact 
to the corresponding author.
Elicitation of Expert Opinion From European Experts
The third elicitation was addressed to European experts 
with knowledge about bovTB and its potential economic 
consequences. Experts were chosen among EU Member States 
that had  experienced  cases of bovTB during the last 10 years; 
a key criterion for expert selection was in-depth knowledge of 
recent or current outbreak(s). An invitation e-mail, with the 
interview questionnaire attached, was sent to potential experts 
from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom, 
and France. Seven experts representing Belgium (n = 1), United 
Kingdom (n = 1), Austria (n = 4) and Portugal (n = 1) agreed 
to participate and were   linterviewed by Skype for Business or 
by phone. The answers from each expert were recorded. Thereafter, 
the completed questionnaire with the individual answers was 
sent to the participants, to give them a chance to adjust their 
answers. The questionnaire can be obtained through contact to 
the corresponding author.
scenario trees and surveillance unit 
sensitivity (SeU)
A scenario tree model was used to simulate each surveillance 
scenario (A, B, C, and D) and its respective probability of detecting 
a bovTB infected pig from the first infected herd or holding (the 
surveillance unit sensitivity or SeU) using the input parameters 
summarised in Table 2.
For instance, for surveillance scenario A and B, the SeU 
represented the combined probabilities that an infected finisher 
pig arriving at the abattoir from the first index herd, was correctly 
classified as positive by the meat inspection used (TMI versus 
VOI). Then according to Figure 1A and Equation 1, the SeU of 
surveillance scenarios A and B, was calculated as:
 SeU = PropL * PropD * PropOUTSIDE * SeCULTURE (1)
PropL was the probability that lesions were present in an infected 
animal at the time of slaughter. Since no information was available 
for pigs, this probability was based upon an Australian study in 
cattle, in which lesions were present in 13 out of 25 bovTB-
infected bovine tuberculin-positive animals subjected to detailed 
necropsy (9). Hence, a Beta [13 + 1, 25–13 + 1] distribution 
was used.
PropD was the probability that the meat inspector detected 
lesions on an infected pig by TMI or VOI. No information was 
available for pigs and therefore information from cattle was used. 
Hence, these probabilities were set as Pert distributions according 
to EFSA (18, 30) and Calvo-Artavia et al. (31). Hence, for TMI 
the PropD was set to Pert(0.47;0.71;0.82) and for VOI: Pert(0.14; 
0.24; 0.34).
In Denmark, only lesions located outside the gastro-intestinal 
tract are considered suspects of bovTB by the authorities (32). 
In response, samples are only submitted to culture for bovTB, 
if the lesions are located outside the gastro-intestinal tract 
(Personal communication J.S. Oberthon, Danish Veterinary and 
Food Administration, 2017). Therefore, an extra node (Figure 1) 
called PropOUTSIDE was inserted into equation 1, representing the 
probability that the lesion was located outside the gastro-intestinal 
tract and consequently was submitted for culture test. Information 
about PropOUTSIDE originated from Bailey et al. (3), who found that 
among 55 bovTB infected pigs (for which information was available 
about location of the lesion), 16 (29%) had lesions in the thoracic 
cavity and six had generalized lesions (11%). Thus, the proportion 
of pigs with lesions, located outside of the gastrointestinal tract 
was 40% and was simulated as: PropOUTSIDE = Beta [(16 + 6) +1, 
55 – (16 + 6) +1].
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SeCULTURE was the sensitivity of the culture test and was set to 
Pert (0.92;0.95;0.98) according to (18, 30, 31).
For surveillance scenarios C and D, SeU was calculated 
according to Figure  1B and Equation 2 to take into account 
that in these scenarios an infected pig could be found positive 
for bovTB in three different ways: (i) because it was tested by 
serology and resulted positive (in serial order) to both antibodies 
and culture, or (ii) because it resulted negative for antibodies, but 
could be still detected by lesions (present outside of the gastro-
intestinal tract) and culture, or (iii) because of lesion(s) present 
outside the gastro-intestinal tract, which lead to submission of 
a sample for culture.
 SeU = [(PropSERO * SeSERO* SeCULTURE) + (PropSERO 
* (1 - SeSERO) * PropL* PropD * PropOUTSIDE * SeCULTURE) + 
(1-PropSERO) * PropL * PropD * PropOUTSIDE * SeCULTURE))]
 (2)
Where, PropSERO was the probability that the processed infected 
pig was tested in the serological test, and this was set to 0.005, 
reflecting the assumption that only one out of 200 pigs delivered 
in a batch would be tested, irrespective of whether TB-like lesions 
were present or not. 1-PropSERO was the probability that the 
infected pig was not tested by serology, set to 0.995.
SeSERO was the sensitivity of the serological test and was set 
to Pert(0.66;0.72;0.82) based upon Cardoso-Toset et al. (33). 
The remaining elements are described in Eq. 1. Moreover, it 
was assumed that infected pigs (carrying M. bovis) had already 
seroconverted at the day of slaughter.
temporal herd sensitivity in the First 
infected herd
The temporal herd sensitivty (HSe) for the first infected herd was 
estimated using the hypergeometric approximation (34, 35), which 
allows taking into account sampling without replacement from a 
finite population of animals. Thus:
 HSe = 1- [1- SlauPigs/Nfinishers * SeU] (WHP * Nfinishers) (3)
Where Nfinishers represented the annual average number of 
finishers produced, per production circle, in the first infected 
herd (≈ 2,600 finishers/year corresponding to 1,200 finishers 
in a production cycle of 5.5 months). SlauPigs represented the 
population of slaughtered pigs from the infected herd (from 
finisher group) by each HRP. Therefore, SlauPigs increased by 
200 processed pigs after each of the six surveillance periods (e.g., 
by 1st HRP = 200 pigs, by 2nd HRP = 200 pigs +200 pigs, and 
so on). This implied that all pigs present at day 1 of disease 
introduction and raised for slaughtering were considered tested 
by meat inspection after six HRPs (SlauPigs/Nfinishers = 1, by the 
6th HRP)
WHP was the within-group prevalence and represented the 
probability that the processed pig was itself infected. WHP was 
set to three different values reflecting a low (0.01), medium (0.05) 
or high within-herd prevalence (0.1) and one sub-scenario was 
run for each of these values. It was assumed that the disease could 
cluster with homogenous prevalence, within different groups of 
the same infected farm. Thus, within-herd prevalence WHP also 
= within group (finisher or other) prevalence. The WHP figures 
were chosen based upon (3) who found 52 United Kingdom 
pig premises with a total of 112 bovTB-infected pigs yielding 
an average of 2.2 infected pigs per premise. Moreover, in half of 
the infected herds (for which information about herd size was 
available) there were fewer than 11 sows or 101 pigs, whereas 
18% of the premises were large with more than 200 sows or 
2,000 pigs (3).
In this way, the temporal HSe was calculated (36–38) in the first 
infected herd after each HRP. Hence, the HSe increased with the 
number of pigs processed and with the number of HRPs elapsed 
since disease introduction.
At the same time, this approach allowed to relate the time 
required for detection (when HSe reaches a high value such as 
>90%) with the probability of disease spread (Pspread see below) 
which could occur meanwhile, before the first infected herd is 
put under restrictions (due to detection of at least one infected 
pig at the abattoir).
Probability of spread during the high-risk 
Period(s)
Apart from the pigs slaughtered during the different HRPs,  it was 
assumed that in the first infected herd also 1,200 growing pigs, 
gilts and sows (Nother) would be present. It was assumed that “if ” 
the farmer moved pigs at least once by the investigated HRP(s); 
he/she could move up to 100 pigs of the Nother animals (nmoved) 
to other herds for breeding for a HRP. The probability of spread 
by each HRPs, called Pspread, was calculated from Equation 4:
 Pspread = 1 – [1 – (Pmovement * nmoved/Nother)] (WHP *Nother) (4)
Pspread was based on the hypergeometric approximation (34) and 
represented the probability of moving at least one infected pig to 
at least another pig herd by the investigated HRP(s).
Pmovement was the probability that the infected herd moved pigs 
to at least one other herd during at least one elapsed HRP. Data 
from movement of individual pigs from 12 Danish non-controlled 
pig herds collected during 2015 showed an annual probability 
of pigs being moved of 28%. This corresponds to 2.5% average 
probability per HRP of 4 weeks. Thus, Pmovement = 1 – (1–0.025) 
number of elapsed HRPs
Therefore, HSe will increase with the number of HRPs elapsed 
since disease introduction, whereas Pspread depends (also) upon 
whether and when animals are moved out of the herd and into other 
premises. For instance, after three HRPs at least one movement 
could occur with probability = Pmovement, and the farmer could 
move 100 animals in one, two or three HRPs. Accordingly, if 
movement(s) occurred, the number of moved animals (nmoved) 
by three HRPs was set with a uniform distribution between 100 
(minimum number of animals moved only in one HRP) and 300 
(maximum number of moved animals in all the three HRPs). 
Thus, Pmovement and nmoved/Nother; represented probabilities of 
two conditional events respectively: (a) the farmer moving at least 
once during the investigated HRP periods, and (b) the probability 
Hansen et al.
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that an infected animal was moved to another herd. The latter was 
repeated for each of the infected animals (WHP * Nother) present 
in the Nother group.
Additionally, it was assumed that the infected animals 
introduced to the secondary infected herd were not further 
moved, and thus, the Pspread was calculated only for the first 
infected index herd. This is a reasonable assumption, since the 
moved infected pigs should not cause infection in the herd mates 
in the receiving herd.
Moreover, once the first infected herd was detected, it was 
assumed that all secondary infected herds would be traced and 
eradication could be achieved; in the first infected herd as well 
as the secondary infected herds. To describe the number of 
secondary infected herds, Nreceived, the data from an outbreak 
of avian TB occurring in Danish pigs in the winter of 2016–17 
was used (29).
The number of infected pigs moved by the elapsed HRP(s), if 
movement took place, was calculated as Poisson(nmoved * WHP).
economic impact
The economic impact stemming from an outbreak of bovTB 
was estimated considering the economic costs carried by the pig 
producers and the abattoirs. These costs related to handling of the 
primary infected herd, eradicating infection from all infected herds, 
and impacts on trade. All cost estimates were in Euros. Cprimary 
included costs related to a primary infected herd under suspicion 
due to (1) carcasses rejected at the abattoir, Crejected, (2) tuberculin 
testing of pigs in suspicious herds, Ctuberculin, (3) extra costs to meat 
inspection due to TMI replacing VOI, CΔMI, and (4) compensation 
to farmers when the day of slaughter is moved forward, Ccompensation, 
due to unsolved suspicion of bovTB (Equation 5). Although the 
compensation covered the lost income of the farmers, this cost was 
added to account for inadequate use of the production facilities 
and hereby constituted a cost to the abattoir.
 Cprimary =
(
Crejected + Ctuberculin + C∆MI + Ccompensation
)
 (5)
Costs of eradication (defined as testing, culling and trace-back of 
infection in a suspect herd) of an outbreak, Ceradication were based 
upon the costs experienced per positive herd in the interviewed 
countries and a comparison of their eradication programs and 
the eradication program described in the Danish legislation. 
Belgium had a much more comprehensive eradication program 
than Denmark. The Austrian program was also considered wider-
ranging, while the eradication program in United Kingdom 
matched the descriptions in the Danish legislation. Costs per 
infected herd were therefore assumed as a weighted average of the 
costs in Belgium, Ceradication BE, Austria, Ceradication AT, and United 
Kingdom, Ceradication UK, and where the weights were chosen by 
the authors based upon the information provided by the experts 
(Equation 6).
 Ceradication =
0.5 ∗ Ceradication BE + 0.75 ∗ Ceradication AT + Ceradication UK
3  
 (6)
The trade impact related to reactions from trade partners, Ctrade, 
included the total loss of income, Loss, in case of market shutdown, 
where the product would subsequently be sold at alternative, 
less attractive markets outside Denmark, during the time of the 
shutdown, Tshutdown. The interviews with experts revealed that 
Japan was viewed as an important, sensitive market. Experts could 
not say precisely if or how Japan would react to findings of bovTB 
in Danish pigs, but a market shutdown could not be excluded. It 
was impossible to say which products would be influenced, the 
length of the shutdown and what would trigger a reaction. In a 
mild case, only export of live pigs was expected to be influenced. 
In a worst case, export of live pigs, pork products, live cattle, beef 
and dairy productions could potentially be influenced. Further, 
other countries, such as China, South Korea and Russia (the latter 
market under the assumption of being reopened in the future) 
could potentially deny imports because of bovTB. To meet these 
uncertainties, it was decided to describe the potential economic 
consequences of a market reaction as a Pert distribution, based on 
a situation, where Japan closed its market for import of live pigs, 
pork products and by-products from pigs, for 3 (minimum), 6 
(mode) or 12 months (max) combined with a 25% price reduction 
resulting from having to sell products on a less attractive market 
as suggested by other authors (39) (Equation 7). Costs related to 
loss in income in case of a national consumer reaction  were also 
considered. However, this was left out based on inputs from the 
experts consulted.
 Ctrade = Loss ∗ Tshutdown (7)
The total costs, Costs, depended on the probability of further spread 
of bovTB (Pspread) during the HRP elapsed from introduction to 
detection as well as the three different costs elements: cost of (i) 
infection in a herd (Cprimary), (ii) eradication due to the number 
of secondary infected herds (Ceradication) and (iii) trade restrictions 
(Ctrade) with their respective probabilities, P, depending on spread 
(S), or no spread (NS).
 Costs ={ Pspread * [(PprimaryS * Cprimary) + ( PeradicsationS * 
Ceradication) + (PTradeS * CTrade)] } + {(1-Pspread) * [(PprimaryNS * 
Cprimary)+ (PeradicationNS * Ceradication ) + (PTradeNS * CTrade)]} (8)
Please see Table 2 for a description of the individual components 
of the formula. PprimaryS and PprimaryNS were set to 1, reflecting that 
there would always be costs for the primary cases, irrespective of 
whether there would be spreading or not to other herds. Moreover, 
PeradicationS was set to 1, reflecting that an eradication would always 
be activated, if infection had spread.
Next, the cost of error, CostError, was calculated as the 
probability of having overlooked all cases of bovTB, (1-HSe), 
by the elapsed HRP(s) , multiplied by the Costs, estimated in 
equation 8:
 CostError = (1-Hse)*Costs (9)
Finally, the surveillance costs, CostSurv, for each scenario were 
calculated considering the costs related to meat inspection and 
serology described in Table  1. A time frame of 30 years was 
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chosen. CostSurv were added to CostError, while taking into 
account that CostSurv would incur every year, whereas CostError 
would only occur, if an incursion of bovTB into Danish pigs 
took place. Next, the average costs per year, CostAverageyears, 
were calculated (Equation 10). Here, three different assumptions 
regarding frequency of incursion, Nincurse, of bovTB in 30 years 
were used: 30 (corresponding to one disease incursion every 
year), three (every 10 years) and one (every 30 years). These 
numbers were chosen to reflect that more than 30 years have 
passed since the last incursion of bovTB into Denmark (1). This 
enabled an identification of the most cost-effective of the three 
scenarios in the long term.
 CostAverageyears= (CostSurv * 30 + CostError * Nincurse)/30
 (10)
results
Probability of detection and spread of 
bovtB
According to the simulations, HSe increased by HRP and WHP 
(Table 3). Hence, the higher the probability of infection, the higher 
the probability of detection, due to more “chances” of finding a case 
of bovTB at meat inspection. Assuming WHP = 5%, HSe reached 
90% by the 2nd HRP for TMI, whereas for VOI this would only 
happen after the 6th HRP. Serology had only a limited impact on 
HSe (Figure 2). This is most likely because we assumed that only 
one animal would be sampled per batch, while at the same time 
assuming a WHP of 5%. For other infections, resulting in a higher 
WHP, one sample per batch may very well be sufficient to detect 
positive batches.
The probability of spread of infection increased by HRP – 
due  to moving animals  - and by the assumed WHP (Table 4). 
The median number of moved infected animals was low (median 
values 1–3), when a WHP of 1% was assumed, and higher (median 
values 10–35) when a WHP of 10% was assumed (Table  4). If 
assuming a WHP of 5%, the median Pspread was 27% after the 2nd 
HRP involving a median of seven infected animals, and likewise 
after the 6th  HRP, the median Pspread was 89% and involved a 
median of 17 infected animals (Table 4).
Figure  2 displays the temporal herd sensitivity (HSe) for 
detection of bovine tuberculosis at meat inspection of finisher 
pigs delivered from the first infected herd, divided according to 
number of elapsed surveillance periods (HRP), and for each of 
the four scenarios. The associated probability of spread of bovine 
tuberculosis (Pspread) from the first infected pig herd to one or 
more other pig herds, is also reported. Here, it was assumed that 
the pig producer could move between 100 and 600 pigs to other 
premises, by one or more (up to six) high-risk periods (HRP/s 
of 4 weeks each), while assuming a within-herd (and within-
group) prevalence of 5% in the first infected pig herd. It is noted 
in Figure 2 that for TMI (Scenario A and C) HSe was much higher 
than Pspread, implying that infection would be more likely to be 
detected in the herd of origin than being spread by the elapsed 
HRP(s). This was also seen for scenario B and D involving VOI, 
however, for those two scenarios the difference between HSe and 
Pspread was smaller, implying a higher probability of spread of 
infection before detection.
economic impact
The annual costs of surveillance, CostSurv, in the form of meat 
inspection amounted to €1.56 million for scenario A, €1.08 million 
for scenario B, €1.72 million for scenario C, and €1.14 million for 
scenario D (Table 1).
According to the experts, the primary costs related to a 
pig farm under suspicion for bovTB, Cprimary,  amounted to 
€1,230, followed by €32,812 in eradication costs for one herd, 
when a case is confirmed. According to the simulations, the 
eradication costs in case of spreading to one or more other herds 
amounted to a median value of €82,250 (90% probability interval: 
taBle 3 |  Estimated ability to detect a hypothetical case of bovine tuberculosis 
in the index pig herd (herd sensitivity, HSe) for each of four meat inspection 
regimes, divided according to within-herd prevalence and time period* (HRP) after 
introduction, Denmark, 2017.
herd sensitivity (%) while assuming a within-herd 
prevalence of
scenario a  
traditional meat 
inspection
1% 5% 10%
  4 weeks 21 (13, 29) 69 (51, 83) 89 (77, 97)
  8 weeks 38 (25, 51) 89 (76, 97) 98 (95, 100)
12 weeks 51 (35, 66) 96 (89, 100) 100 (99, 100)
16 weeks 62 (44, 77) 99 (95, 100) 100 (100, 100)
20 weeks 70 (52, 85) 99 (98, 100) 100 (100, 100)
24 weeks 76 (59, 90) 100 (99, 100) 100 (100, 100)
scenario B  
Visual-only 
inspection
  4 weeks 8 (5, 12) 33 (21, 47) 55 (38, 72)
  8 weeks 15 (9, 22) 55 (38, 72) 79 (61, 92)
12 weeks 22 (13, 32) 70 (51, 85) 90 (76, 98)
16 weeks 28 (17, 40) 79 (61, 92) 95 (85, 99)
20 weeks 34 (21, 48) 85 (70, 96) 97 (91, 100)
24 weeks 39 (25, 54) 90 (76, 98) 99 (94, 100)
scenario c  
serology and 
traditional meat 
inspection
  4 weeks 21 (14, 30) 69 (53, 83) 89 (77, 97)
  8 weeks 38 (26, 51) 90 (77, 97) 99 (95, 100)
12 weeks 52 (36, 67) 96 (89, 100) 100 (99, 100)
16 weeks 62 (45, 78) 99 (95, 100) 100 (100, 100)
20 weeks 70 (53, 85) 99 (98, 100) 100 (100, 100)
24 weeks 77 (59, 90) 100 (99, 100) 100 (100, 100)
scenario d  
serology and 
visual-only 
inspection
  4 weeks 8 (5, 12) 34 (22, 48) 56 (39, 72)
  8 weeks 16 (10, 23) 56 (39, 73) 80 (63, 93)
12 weeks 23 (14, 33) 71 (53, 86) 90 (78, 98)
16 weeks 29 (18, 41) 80 (63, 93) 95 (87, 100)
20 weeks 35 (22, 49) 86 (72, 96) 98 (92, 100)
24 weeks 40 (28, 55) 90 (77, 98) 99 (95, 100)
*Finisher pigs are delivered to slaughter every 4 weeks.
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€67,285; 150,364). The potential negative impact on trade, Ctrade, 
amounted to a median value of €65 million (90% probability 
interval: €32.5 to €130.0) (Table 2).
In Table 5, the average annual cost assuming one incursion of 
bovTB into Danish pigs per 1, 10 or 30 years, CostAverageyears, is 
shown, while assuming a WHP of 5%. The highest costs were seen, 
when it was assumed that there would be one incursion of bovTB into 
Danish pigs every year, and here the scenarios A and C - involving 
TMI with and without use of serology - were associated with the 
lowest annual costs. However, if it was assumed that there would 
only be an incursion every 10 or 30 years, then the lowest average 
annual costs were seen for the scenarios B and D involving VOI. In 
those cases, the annual costs were close to the annual costs of meat 
inspection.
discussiOn
Key Finding of study
The work undertaken illustrates a hypothetical situation, where 
bovTB is introduced to Danish non-controlled pigs, and where 
a subsequent detection by different surveillance approaches has 
economic consequences depending on the spread of disease before 
detection, control measures implemented thereafter, and reaction of 
Figure 2 |  Display of the temporal herd sensitivity (HSe) for detection of bovine tuberculosis at meat inspection of finisher pigs delivered from the first infected 
herd, divided according to number of elapsed surveillance periods (HRP), and according to four different kinds of meat inspection. The associated probability of 
spread of bovine tuberculosis (PSpread) from the first infected pig herd to one or more other pigs herds, is also reported assuming that the pig producer could move 
pigs (between 100 to 600) to other premises, by one or more (up to 6) high risk periods (HRP/s of 4 weeks each) while assuming a within-herd (and within-group) 
prevalence of 5% in the first infected pig herd.
taBle 4 | Median probability of spreada of bovine tuberculosis (bovTB) from one hypothetical infected pig herd to one or more pig herds as well as number of moved 
infected pigs, divided according to time period (HRP) after introduction, while assuming a within-herd prevalence of 1, 5 or 10%
Median probability (5th; 95th percentiles) of spread of bovine tuberculosis and number of infected pigs moved to other premises
Within-herd prevalence 1% Within-herd prevalence 5% Within-herd prevalence 10%
high-risk 
period
Probability of 
spread (in %)
no. of moved 
infected animals
Probability of 
spread (in %)
no. of moved 
infected animals
Probability of 
spread (in %)
no. of moved 
infected animals
  4 weeks 2.5 (2.5, 2.5) 1 (0, 3) 11.8 (11.8, 11.8) 5 (2, 9) 22.1 (22.1, 22.1) 10 (5, 15)
  8 weeks 7.2 (5.1, 9.2) 1 (0, 4) 31.0 (22.9, 38.3) 7 (3, 13) 52.4 (40.5, 62.0) 15 (8, 23)
12 weeks 13.7 (7.8, 19.3) 2 (0, 5) 52.1 (33.2, 65.7) 10 (4, 18) 77.0 (55.4, 88.2) 20 (9, 33)
16 weeks 21.6 (10.5, 31.4) 2 (0, 6) 70.4 (42.7, 84.8) 12 (4, 22) 91.2 (67.1, 97.7) 24 (10, 42)
20 weeks 30.4 (13.4, 44.3) 3 (0, 7) 83.6 (51.2, 94.6) 15 (5, 27) 97.3 (76.2, 99.7) 30 (11, 51)
24 weeks 39.6 (16.3, 56.8) 3 (0, 8) 91.9 (58.8, 98.5) 17 (5, 32) 99.4 (83.0, 100.0) 35 (11, 61)
a: Probability that the farmer moves at least one infected animal to at least one secondary Danish pig herd. For example: by the end of the second HRP (by 8 weeks) the probability 
that the farmer moves at least one infected animal to at least one secondary pig herd is 7.2% (5.1%; 9.2%) when assuming a within-group (Nother = 1,200 animals) animal prevalence 
of 1% in the source index farm. After HRP 1 only one estimate for the probability of spread is available, because only 100 animals out of 1,200 in the Nother group were assumed 
could be moved (no uniform distribution used to simulate nmoved/NOther in Eq. 4).
10 June  2018 | Volume 5 | Article 92Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www. frontiersin. org
Hansen et al. Meat Inspection of Outdoor Pigs
trade partners. These findings are dependent on critical assumptions. 
First, it was assumed that bovTB is introduced and detected in this 
category of pigs and not first in other species, such as cattle or deer. 
If the disease is detected in cattle or wildlife, it is expected to activate 
an eradication programme and no cost of error related to overlooked 
cases in pigs should occur. The other assumption is that the disease is 
detected at some point. The cost of error would only occur, when the 
disease is detected. Until detection, the cost of overlooking positive 
cases would be zero, because no clinical symptoms and production 
costs are expected. With pigs assumed to be acting as dead-end hosts, 
there is also a probability that a disease incursion would die out and 
not be detected. In that case, there would be no cost of error from 
overlooking all positive cases.
Once detected, there may be substantial costs due to a market 
reaction to bovTB in pigs. The highest cost of error occurred 
for the two scenarios assuming VOI. However, considering the 
surveillance costs, the scenarios were more similar. The total 
economic impact was comparable across the four scenarios, but 
stemmed from different sources of costs. This made the different 
options more or less sensitive to measures that increase economic 
efficiency. To determine the future surveillance strategy for 
bovTB in pigs, we included the probability of incursion of 
bovTB into Danish pigs by running three scenarios, assuming 
one incursion every year as well as every 10 or 30 years, where the 
two latter time periods reflect the current situation in Denmark, 
where bovTB has been absent for more than 30 years. The average 
annual costs was lowest for the scenario involving VOI, which 
would advocate for a change to VOI on pigs from non-controlled 
housings, while knowing that there is a possibility for higher 
cost of error in an individual year, if the disease is introduced.
Denmark has not had any cases of bovTB for more than 30 
years, and if infection should enter the country, the prevailing 
opinion is that it would be via imported cattle. Therefore, VOI 
could replace TMI in finisher pigs raised under non-controlled 
housing conditions. This was also the conclusion of EFSA (18). 
Hence, countries (or regions within countries) without bovTB 
would be able to replace TMI with VOI, especially because bovTB 
is not considered meat-borne, and the role of meat inspection 
is to detect bovTB to maintain animal health, and pigs may be 
considered dead-end hosts.
shortcoming and limitations of the 
Modelling approach
The main shortcoming was related to the limited knowledge of 
bovTB in swine. This was also found by EFSA (16) that used a 
qualitative approach, when assessing the value of the cuts into the 
mandibular and gastro-intestinal lymph nodes of pigs. Similarly, 
Ellebroek et al. (40) elicited expert opinion to compensate for 
the lack of published data regarding the behaviour of M. bovis 
and the effect of meat inspection on the probability of detection 
of M. bovis in pigs. To take into account this large uncertainty, 
we chose to use scenario analysis – whereby the effect of various 
scenarios could be studied. This approach was expected to show 
more directly the impact of a given parameter on the outcome 
compared to using a sensitivity analysis. In the following, the 
parameter values for WHP, PropL, PropD, PropOUTSIDE, SeSERO, 
Pspread, Ceradication and Ctrade are discussed with respect to eventual 
short-comings and limitations.
If M. bovis entered a pig  herd, intra-species disease 
transmission would not be expected, and therefore the simple 
modelling applied can be justified. A high within-herd prevalence 
(WHP) could be expected, if pigs were fed bovTB infected 
material e.g., in the format of unpasteurized milk or whey. A 
medium WHP could be expected, if the disease was introduced 
by another species permanently present, e.g., infected wildlife 
or guard llamas, kept among the pigs for example through the 
oral-faecal route (41). To account for uncertainty, we used three 
different WHPs for the initial modelling, and used a WHP of 5% 
when illustrating the economic consequences.
The probability of lesions being present PropL was described 
using data from an Australian study on cattle, because no 
studies have been conducted in swine. This implies that there is 
uncertainty around this input. According the Australian study, 
lesions were only present in around half of the bovTB cases (9), 
which is overall speaking in line with (7) and (40).
The inspector’s ability to detect TB like lesions (PropD), known 
as the sensitivity of the meat inspection (42) may vary among 
taBle 5 |  Average annual costs related to surveillance in the form of meat 
inspection (divided according to four different regimes*) and costs related to an 
outbreak while assuming one incursion of bovine tuberculosis into the Danish pig 
population in 1, 10 or 30 years and a subsequent within-herd prevalence 5% in 
the first infected pig farm.
high-risk period average annual cost in million € (90% probability 
interval)
1 year 10 years 30 years
scenario a 
  4 weeks 3.02 (2.40–4.00) 1.71 (1.64–1.80) 1.61 (1.59–1.64)
  8 weeks 2.32 (1.89–3.01) 1.64 (1.59–1.71) 1.59 (1.57–1.61)
12 weeks 1.93 (1.67–2.38) 1.60 (1.57–1.64) 1.57 (1.56–1.59)
16 weeks 1.70 (1.59–1.93) 1.57 (1.56–1.60) 1.56 (1.56–1.57)
20 weeks 1.67 (1.60–1.78) 1.56 (1.56–1.58) 1.56 (1.56–1.57)
24 weeks 1.58 (1.56–1.62) 1.56 (1.56–1.57) 1.56 (1.56–1.56)
scenario B
  4 weeks 4.22 (3.02–5.77) 1.39 (1.27–1.55) 1.18 (1.14–1.24)
  8 weeks 4.05 (2.84–5.83) 1.38 (1.26–1.56) 1.18 (1.14–1.24)
12 weeks 3.71 (2.52–5.56) 1.34 (1.22–1.53) 1.17 (1.13–1.23)
16 weeks 3.31 (2.21–5.15) 1.30 (1.19–1.49) 1.15 (1.12–1.22)
20 weeks 2.86 (1.89–4.42) 1.26 (1.16–1.41) 1.14 (1.11–1.19)
24 weeks 2.40 (1.62–3.73) 1.21 (1.13–1.35) 1.12 (1.10–1.17)
scenario c
  4 weeks 3.18 (2.55–4.11) 1.87 (1.80–1.96) 1.77 (1.75–1.80)
  8 weeks 2.42 (2.04–3.08) 1.79 (1.75–1.86) 1.74 (1.73–1.77)
12 weeks 2.09 (1.83–2.53) 1.76 (1.73–1.80) 1.73 (1.72–1.75)
16 weeks 1.86 (1.75–2.09) 1.74 (1.72–1.76) 1.73 (1.72–1.73)
20 weeks 1.83 (1.76–1.95) 1.73 (1.73–1.74) 1.72 (1.72–1.73)
24 weeks 1.74 (1.72–1.78) 1.72 (1.72–1.73) 1.72 (1.72–1.72)
scenario d
  4 weeks 4.23 (3.05–5.76) 1.45 (1.33–1.60) 1.24 (1.20–1.29)
  8 weeks 4.05 (2.87–5.77) 1.43 (1.31–1.60) 1.24 (1.20–1.29)
12 weeks 3.67 (2.54–5.47) 1.39 (1.28–1.57) 1.22 (1.19–1.28)
16 weeks 3.25 (2.17–5.01) 1.35 (1.24–1.53) 1.21 (1.17–1.27)
20 weeks 2.81 (1.90–4.27) 1.31 (1.22–1.45) 1.20 (1.17–1.24)
24 weeks 2.44 (1.68–3.70) 1.27 (1.19–1.40) 1.18 (1.16–1.23)
*Please see Table 3 for a description of the four scenarios representing four different 
meat inspection regimes.
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abattoirs and inspectors. In addition, no standard method for 
valuation of the sensitivity of VOI and TMI has been developed, 
imposing uncertainty on the applied values for sensitivity (18). 
The experience in Denmark is that outbreaks of avian tuberculosis 
in pigs due to use of peat for young pigs can be detected by VOI 
(Personal communication J.S. Oberthon, Danish Veterinary and 
Food Administration, 2017). Still, there is agreement that VOI 
is associated with a lower ability to detect bovTB than TMI (13, 
14, 43), but it is unknown how much lower the sensitivity is. 
Moreover, the meat inspection sensitivity is most likely affected 
by the line speed, which varies between slaughter plants and 
countries, as well as the number of infected carcasses and the age 
of the slaughtered animals. A larger prevalence of TB-like lesions 
and older animals increase the sensitivity, where younger stock 
and a lower prevalence are known to decrease the sensitivity and 
thereby increase the probability of overlooking any positive case 
(30, 44). However, the apparent higher risk in sows may also be a 
result of a longer lifespan, whereby the probability of infection is 
increased. For reasons of simplicity, the effect of age was ignored 
in the present analysis.
Regarding PropOUTSIDE: Whether a positive case was detected 
and sent for culture testing, at post mortem inspection or not, 
relied on several factors. First, the lesion must be visually 
observable and located outside the gastro-intestinal tract. The 
latter is due to the current meat inspection circular in place in 
Denmark, which stipulates that lesions located in the gastro-
intestinal tract need to be dealt with at meat inspection but do 
not require submission for testing. The reason for this approach 
is the presence of TB-like lesions, which are not caused by bovTB 
but other bacteria such as Rhodococcus equi or M. avium, in 
which case the legislation does not require testing or any risk 
mitigation apart from local condemnation of the affected lymph 
nodes and organs. If lesions located in the gastro-intestinal tract 
were considered as suspects, then  traditional and visual-only 
inspection should give higher sensitivity than that estimated in 
this study, though costs of testing would be higher due to more 
samples tested. A compromise may consist of using Food Chain 
Information from the herd of origin to distinguish between low- 
and high-risk herds, where samples should be taken in the latter. 
Such information may e.g., be presence of imported animals or 
camelides on the farm.
The sensitivity of serological tests, SeSERO, was easier to value, 
as it depended less on subjective assessments. Still, different 
methods are available with each their sensitivity. Cardoso-
Toset et al. (33) investigated five different serological tests for 
detection of bovTB in pigs, used as supplement to the post 
mortem meat inspection. Because of uncertainty of which test 
to use in Denmark, the lowest and highest estimates were applied 
in the calculation of cost of error. In scenario C and D, only one 
pig from each batch delivered for slaughter was assumed to be 
tested using serology.
Regarding Pspread: For further spread to occur, infected pigs 
should be moved or other infected animals (of other species) 
should be moved, from which the disease could be transmitted 
to pigs. An estimate for the probability of spread was measured 
using Equation 3 and 4. We assumed that up to 100 pigs could be 
moved per high-risk period to other herds for breeding. Hereby, 
the probability of spread was calculated as the probability of 
positive pigs being moved out of the herd. If the disease was 
introduced by another animal than an infected pig, for instance 
an infected guard llama, and this animal was moved between 
herds, the probability of spread could be higher than estimated.
Usually, the movements of pigs in Denmark are by contract 
between the producer and the individual purchasers, and mixing 
of pigs from different herds is considered poor management and 
therefore not recommended. This implies that although between 
five and 17 infected pigs were assumed to be moved within a 
production cycle (when assuming a WHP of 5%), these pigs 
would most likely only go to a few farms. This was confirmed 
by considering the data describing the outbreak of avian TB 
occurring in Danish pigs in the winter of 2016–17; 74% of the 
sow herds involved only moved pigs to one herd (33). Data from 
this outbreak were used to estimate the number of holdings pigs 
were moved to, Nreceived, if moved.
Regarding Ceradication: In Denmark, suspicion of bovTB 
requires reporting to the authority. If the case is confirmed, 
the authority must decide how the case is handled. Possible 
solutions are tuberculin test of pigs in the infected herd and 
culling of infected or multiple animals. Moreover, a trace-back 
and forth will be undertaken (45). From the interview study 
of international experts, it was seen that Belgium had a more 
widespread eradication program compared to the contingency 
program in Denmark. The experience from Belgium is that all 
cattle on the infected cattle farm and on its contact farms were 
tested once the outbreak was detected and additionally three 
times during a 5 year follow-up period. Only cattle farms were 
included in the Belgian eradication program, as bovTB is not 
considered an issue in pigs. In Austria, eradication also involves 
more farms than the Danish legislation suggest. A difference 
between Denmark and Austria is that in Austria it is common to 
pasture cattle in certain Alp valleys, where bovTB is known for 
being present in the wildlife. Cattle kept in these areas are tested 
independent of lesions of bovTB. Both Belgium and Austria have 
kept their OTF status, despite the positive cases, due to a low 
prevalence. United Kingdom is not OTF; 3,578 UK cattle herds 
were not officially TB free by the end of 2016, due to a bovTB 
incident (46). Based on the estimates given in the interviews, 
United Kingdom spends less per infected farm than Belgium 
and Austria, but in total the costs to eradication exceeds the 
other countries by far.
The Danish legislation allows the eradication to be tailored 
to the specific case (45) and no detailed description of an 
eradication plan is available, since it was last put into action 
in 1988 (Personal communication, B.B. Jørgensen, Ministry of 
Environment and Food of Denmark, 2017). Hence, there is some 
uncertainty related to the cost estimates for eradication, also 
because the data we have used are referring to cattle farms during 
an eradication phase. Still, these were the best estimates we could 
find. Therefore, the figures should be interpreted with care.
Estimates and assumptions for calculation of the impact on 
trade Ctrade related to cases of bovTB in pigs was based bovTB 
in cattle. It was not possible to base the estimates on bovTB in 
pigs on literature, as literature on bovTB in pigs and historical 
data hereof were scarce. Consequently, the cost of bovTB was 
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calculated under the assumption that the reaction to bovTB in 
pigs would be similar to the reaction of bovTB in cattle. This 
assumption may have led to overestimation of the expected costs.
Perspectives
Meat inspection is undertaken to ensure that the meat delivered 
to consumers is safe and wholesome. Moreover, meat inspection is 
used to ensure the health and welfare of the slaughtered animals – 
including detection of notifiable diseases such as bovTB. To meet 
these objectives, legislation is put in place with individual variations 
all over the world reflecting both true and perceived differences in 
risk. This implies that for countries exporting, meat inspection is 
also undertaken to obtain acceptance of equivalence of the trade 
partners.
Denmark has a large export of pig meat. Therefore, acceptance 
of equivalence from important trade partners is of paramount 
importance before any change in meat inspection will be 
implemented. Risk assessments have proven to be an effective 
instrument to illustrate pros and cons related to palpation and 
incisions into the various organs (13, 14). When considering 
replacing TMI with VOI of finisher pigs from the non-controlled 
housing compartment, bovTB has been identified to be the 
main hazard, for which there may be a risk of overlooking cases 
(13). Others have suggested Toxoplasma gondii and Trichinella 
spp. (19). However, the latter two hazards cannot be detected 
macroscopically at meat inspection anyway. Therefore, the 
specific type of meat inspection is not relevant. Instead, the 
detection of the presence of these two hazards requires testing. 
Alternatively, biosecurity level using the concept of controlled 
housing can be used as an indicator to divide the population into 
a high- and low-risk group where e.g., only pigs from the high-
risk compartment is tested. The latter approach is accepted for 
Trichinella spp., as it is known that finisher pigs from controlled 
holdings have a negligible probability of harbouring Trichinella 
spp. (11, 12). The use of controlled housing could also be suggested 
for T. gondii, as studies have shown a very low prevalence of T. 
gondii in finishing pigs raised in controlled housing holdings 
(47). Regarding avian TB, the prevailing opinion is that it is not 
a meat-borne hazard. Still, presence of tubercles in a carcass 
is considered unwanted and should be dealt with. A private 
standard is in place in Denmark, prohibiting use of peat in pigs 
unless approved by the health department of the Danish Specific 
Pathogen Free (SPF-SuS) system (48). This prohibition has lately 
been extended to also cover the specific type of peat, which 
caused the outbreak occurring in Denmark in 2016–17; a type 
of peat which had previously been allowed due to no historic 
cases of avian TB.
It could be more cost-effective to direct resources to 
surveillance in imported animals at risk of harbouring bovTB 
and coming into contact with Danish livestock than to use TMI 
in pigs from non-controlled housing as a way of surveying for 
bovTB. The costs associated with such surveillance are expected 
to be limited, because only a low number of imports is taking place 
annually; between 2014 and 2016, an average of 366 pigs, 217 
cattle (1) and 11 camelides (based upon information from Traces 
provided by the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration, 
2017) were imported into Denmark annually.
cOnclusiOns
TMI resulted in lowest cost of error, if one incursion of bovTB was 
expected every year. However, when assuming one introduction 
in 10 or 30 years, VOI resulted in lowest average annual costs. 
Additional use of serological testing for bovTB did not contribute 
to lowering the average annual costs associated with overlooking 
bovTB in a pig herd.
Should bovTB enter a pig herd belonging to the non-
controlled housing compartment, then infection may die out or 
go unnoticed for some time. If infection does not die out, it will 
be detected (sooner with TMI, and later with VOI), because of 
the high number of pigs subjected to meat inspection. Movement 
of infected pigs to a few other herds may occur before infection is 
being detected, in particular if VOI is applied. However, pigs act 
as dead-end hosts for bovTB, and infection is not assumed to be 
meat-borne. Finally, Denmark has been free from bovTB for more 
than 30 years among others due to a very low number of imports 
of livestock for breeding and no import of pigs for slaughter. 
Therefore, seen on the long perspective it would be cost-effective 
to replace the current TMI of finishing pigs from non-controlled 
housing with VOI, although the latter is associated with a lower 
ability to detect bovTB. Moreover, it could be more cost-efficient 
to direct resources to bovTB surveillance in imported, high-risk 
animals coming into contact with Danish livestock.
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